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1. Introduction 
 Over the course of the last three decades, emerging markets as currently designated, have, using 
stock market liberalizations opened up their domestic firms to foreign ownership. For example, using the 
official liberalization dates provided by Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Portugal (1986), Greece (1987), 
Thailand (1987), followed by Malaysia (1988), and Morocco (1989) were amongst the first emerging 
markets to liberalize their stock markets. Since then, others have followed, including Argentina (1989), 
Brazil (1991), and India (1992). More recently, countries such as Tunisia (1995) and South Africa (1996) 
have followed suit. Subsequently, a large literature has shown that this type of financial liberalization 
reform has proved beneficial. At the firm-level and consistent with international asset pricing models, 
stock market liberalizations tend to reduce the cost of equity capital as a result of greater risk sharing 
between domestic and foreign investors. In turn, this has resulted in reduced financing constraints (Kim 
and Signal, 2000)), increased investment (Henry, 2000; Mitton, 2006 using firm-level data), improved 
operating performance (Mitton, 2006), and enhanced stock prices (Chari and Henry, 2004). Perhaps then 
not surprisingly, Mitton and O’Connor (2011) show that these realized gains impact positively on the 
value of these firms. Using Tobin’s q to proxy for firm value, they uncover an “investable premium” in the 
region of 9% for investable firms. At the country (aggregate) level, such reforms have resulted in greater 
investment and ultimately economic growth (Bekaert et al., 2001, 2005; Gupta and Yuan, 2009).    
 However, with some exceptions (Mitton, 2006; Mitton and O’Connor, 2011), much of this 
analysis has been performed with the average firm in mind, which potentially ignores the heterogeneous 
effects that financial liberalization has across firms, since firms with the most to gain from becoming 
investable e.g., firms with sizable financing constraints, are likely to benefit the most. Consistent with this 
view, Mitton and O’Connor (2011) show that the greatest valuations gains from stock market 
liberalizations accrue to financially constrained firms (as measured using investment-cashflow sensitivities 
(Fazzari et al., 1988)). Furthermore, the ability of firms to attract outside/foreign investment is in large 
part contingent on their ability to convince outsider investors that expropriation risk is low. Since 
investors tend to invest in transparent, well-governed firms (Leuz et al., 2009; Aggarwal et al., 2005), this 
then suggests that the greatest gains to financial liberalization should accrue to transparent, well-governed 
firms, where the consumption of private benefits is low. In contrast, poorly governed firms are likely to 
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gain very little or potentially nothing at all from financial liberalization. Hence, the “investable premium” 
is likely to be much higher for transparent, well-governed firms. In this paper, I test this proposition. 
Specifically, I examine, whether the “investable premium” documented by Mitton and O’Connor (2011) is 
greatest for these transparent, well-governed firms.   
 To do so, I form a panel of 1,510 firms: 251 investable and 1,259 non-investable firms, and use 
Tobin’s q to proxy for firm value. While on average, corporate governance practices tend to be less 
transparent in emerging markets (relative to firms in developed countries), sizable variation in corporate 
governance practices exists both across and within emerging market countries (Klapper and Love, 2004; 
Durnev and Kim, 2005). To capture this variation in governance practices across firms and countries, I 
use three different measures commonly employed in other studies. The first classifies firms as either dual- 
or single-class share firms. Typically, single-class share firms are more transparent and better-governed 
than dual-class share firms (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Masulis et al., 2009). In the case of the latter, insiders 
posses sizable control rights without commensurate cashflow rights, by holding shares with greater voting 
rights. In this instance, controlling insiders create a ‘wedge’ between their voting and cashflow rights, 
creating a situation whereby expropriation is costly for minority outsiders, and ultimately beneficial for the 
controlling insiders. A large literature suggests that outsiders, most notably institutional investors are 
reluctant to invest in such firms (Leuz et al., 2009; Aggarwal et al., 2005; Li et al., 2008).1 Thus, a priori, I 
would expect that single-class share investable firms would reap large valuation gains from becoming 
investable, both on an absolute basis, and relative to dual-class firms.  Whether dual-class share firms reap 
any valuation gains is an open empirical question. Recent work suggests that dual-class firms experience 
permanent valuation gains from another aspect of internationalizations, namely international cross-listings 
(King and Segal, 2009). However, they do so through legal bonding arising from cross-listing in the U.S.2 
While equity market liberalizations are associated with improvements in firms’ information environment 
                                                 
1 Recent work has focused on examining the governance preferences of institutional investors (McCahery et al., 
2009; Bushee et al., 2007; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). These papers find that institutional investors have both a 
preference for well-governed firms, and a desire to improve this governance through what is commonly referred to 
as “shareholder activism”. For a review of the governance role played by institutional investors, see Gillan and Starks 
(2003). Recent work questions the governance role played by institutional investors in the current financial crisis. 
Banks with high institutional ownership performed worse than banks with less institutional ownership, because 
institutional investors encouraged greater risk-taking prior to the crisis (Erkens et al., 2010).        
2 King and Segal (2009) show that bonding alone is sufficient for dual-class Canadian firms to reap a permanent 
“cross-listing premium”.  
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(Bae et al., 2006); they are not accompanied with any formal bonding mechanism.3 Thus, absent bonding, 
dual-class investable firms are likely to reap little valuation gains, since risk sharing through an expansion 
of their shareholder base is likely to be minimal.4 Second, I use two measures, which gauge the extent of 
agency costs in a firm, namely the ratio of sales-to-assets, and operating expenses-to-sales. Since agency 
costs are decreasing (increasing) in the former (latter), a priori, I would expect that the greatest valuation 
gains accrue to firms with a high sales-to-assets ratio, and a low operating expenses-to-sales ratio. 
 This is exactly what I find. I begin by reconfirming the findings of Mitton and O’Connor (2011). 
For the average firm, investability increases firm value in the region of 10.5%. In turn, I show that this 
“investable premium” is greatest for single-class share firms. Dual-class share firms do not experience an 
“investable premium”, relative to other single- and dual-class non-investable firms, but do so relative to 
their counterpart non-investable dual-class firms. Next, using the agency cost measures; I find that better-
governed firms experience the largest “investable premia”. All in all, these findings are consistent with a 
large literature, which shows that investors are less likely to invest in poorly governed firms (Leuz et al., 
2009; Aggarwal et al., 2005), and appear to confirm Stulz’s (2005) assertion that the gains from financial 
globalization (stock market liberalizations in this instance) are limited by what he refers to as the agency 
problem of “corporate insider discretion”. Here the agency cost arises since insiders run the firm in their 
own best interests, and not in the interests of outside minority shareholders. Consequently 
outsiders/institutional investors are less likely to invest in these firms. The result is that poorly-governed 
firms and dual-class share firms in particular gain little, or at least in the case of the latter, much less than 
their single-class share counterparts. As a result, these findings suggest that firms should improve their 
governance prior to becoming investable in order maximize the subsequent valuation gains. Since stock 
market liberalizations tend to occur when financial markets are already well-developed (Kim and Kenny, 
2007), and the costs of improving corporate governance tend to be much lower as a result (Doidge et al., 
                                                 
3 Lang et al. (2003) relate the valuation gains from cross-listing in the U.S. to improvements in firms’ information 
environment (i.e. increased analyst following and improved forecast accuracy). Thus, even absent bonding, 
(voluntary) improvements in a firm’s information environment may be sufficient to generate an “investable 
premium”.     
4 Of course, this does not rule out the possibility that these firms may be able to attract foreign investors by 
voluntarily providing better disclosures and improving their corporate governance. Along these lines, Hope et al. 
(2010) show how cross-listing firms not mandated to provide greater disclosures (i.e. Level 1/Rule 144a firms) 
actually provide more frequent and higher quality disclosures than Level 2/3 firms who are mandated to do so.    
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2007), then the net effect (i.e. the benefits of becoming investable less the costs of corporate governance 
improvements prior to becoming investable) of becoming investable is still likely to be positive.5     
 The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I describe the data used in the study. In 
Section 3 I report results on the relation between investability, corporate governance and firm value. 
Section 4 concludes.   
 
2. Data 
 I begin by sourcing an initial sample of all 2,784 firms from the major markets of the IFC 
Emerging Market Database (EMDB) that were deemed investable at any time between 1980 and 2000. 
Like Mitton (2006) and Mitton and O’Connor (2011), I measure the openness of a firm’s stock to foreign 
investors using the “investable” measure provided by the EMDB. The IFC designates a firm as investable 
if its stock is free from both country-level and firm-level restrictions on foreign investment. It also 
requires that the stocks have sufficient size and liquidity to be realistically available to foreign investors. I 
define a firm as investable in a given year if the firm’s stock appears in the IFC investable index by 
December of that year. As a secondary measure of openness I use the “degree-open” investable measure, 
a continuous variable ranging from zero (not open to foreign investors) to one (fully open to foreign 
investors). As noted in Edison and Warnock (2003), there are limitations to using these measures. 
However, like Mitton and O’Connor (2011), I don’t believe that they introduce any significant biases in 
the tests performed in this paper. The sample covers the period from 1980 to 2000.   
 To be included in the final sample, firms must have financial data available in the Worldscope 
database and satisfy a number of minimum-data requirements. First, I require that firms that become 
investable in the sample period have financial data available at least one year before and one year after the 
year in which they are first deemed investable.6 Second, firms that never become investable are required to 
have financial data available one year either side of the median year in which firms are first investable in 
their respective countries.7 After imposing these requirements, I lose, from my initial sample, all firms 
                                                 
5 Along similar lines, Kling and Weitzel (2011) and Chiang and Ko (2009) explore the relationship between corporate 
governance and internationalizations for Chinese and Taiwanese firms, respectively.    
6 There are firms in the final sample that become investable, subsequently become de-investable and investable once 
again. I require data to be available prior to their initial investable date.   
7 The first year in which firms first become investable are presented in Table 1 for each country.   
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from the Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, Jordan, Morocco, Poland, Russia, Sri Lanka, Slovakia, 
Venezuela and Zimbabwe since all firms from these countries fail to satisfy the minimum data 
requirements.  My final sample outlined in Table 1 consists of 251 investable firms from twenty countries, 
namely, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea (Republic), 
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. The 
total number of non-investable firms is 1,259, which when added to the 251 investable firms results in a 
final sample of 1,510 firms. In Table 1, I outline by country, the number of investable (# Inv) and non-
investable (# NI) firms, the number of firm-year observations (# Obs), and the total number of firms (# 
Total). The number of sample firms per country varies significantly, ranging from a minimum of 8 in 
Colombia (Corresponding to 63 firm-year observations) to a high of 223 in Malaysia (Corresponding to 
1,671 firm year observations). Korea provides the greatest number of investable firms (56), while 
Indonesia provides just one. The total number of firm-year observations is 9,992. 
 Table 1 also presents three key dates for each country: namely, the first year in which the sample 
of firms in each country are designated investable (First Inv); the first year in which a closed-end country 
fund is available for each country (Country Fund); and the first year in which a sample firm in each 
country cross-lists in the United States as an American Depositary Receipt (First ADR). Country fund 
data is sourced from Bekaert et al. (2005) and Patro (2005). All information on cross-listed firms is 
sourced from the Bank of New York, and cross-referenced with information from Deutsche Bank, JP 
Morgan, the New York Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ.  I take great care in order to identify a firm’s 
initial listing. To do so, I consult the historical records from the Bank of New York (since the currently 
available on-line records refer to a firm’s current - not previous/initial - cross-listing). I cross-reference 
this data with the cross-listing database provided by Citibank. They flag firms that have changed their 
cross-listing status by including a “successor depositary receipt” data type for all firms. South Africa (18) 
and Mexico (14) provide the greatest number of cross-listing firms.  
 I employ Tobin’s q to measure firm value, where Tobin’s q is defined as the book value of debt 
plus market capitalization divided by the book value of assets. Market value of debt is proxied using its 
book value counterpart, and the replacement cost of assets as the book value of assets. Book value of debt 
is calculated as the book value of total assets less the book value of equity. These simplifications are 
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unavoidable. Doidge et al., (2004, 2009), Gozzi et al. (2008), and Mitton and O’Connor (2011) all use 
Tobin’s q to proxy for firm value in their studies on the valuation effects of international cross-listings, 
internationalizations, and investability, respectively. Furthermore, all three calculate Tobin’s q exactly as I 
do. All firm-level financial information is sourced from Worldscope for each year from 1980 to 2000.  I 
control for firm and industry related factors commonly employed in other studies using Tobin’s q. I use 
the average (geometric) sales growth (inflation-adjusted) over the last two years and global industry q to 
account for firm and industry growth, respectively. Based upon the general industry classification codes 
provided by Worldscope, the (yearly) mean global industry q is calculated as the average q of all global 
firms within each classification. The general industry classification codes are; 1 (Industrial), 2 (Utility), 3 
(Transportation), 4 (Bank/Savings & Loan), 5 (Insurance), 6 (Other Financial). I use the log of sales 
(inflation-adjusted and in $U.S.), rather than total assets (given the definition of Tobin’s q) to control for 
firm size. Like King and Segal (2009), I also control for firm leverage and profitability. Leverage is 
calculated as total debt to assets, and profitability as earnings before interest and taxation to total assets. 
Tobin’s q, sales growth, firm size, leverage and profitability are winsorized at the 1 and 99% tails of the 
distribution to remove the confounding effects of outliers. Finally, I exclude financial firms since these 
firms are more likely to be valued differently from non-financial firms.   
 To measure the strength of corporate governance, I use three different measures. The first is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm is a dual-class share firm. A large literature has 
documented that since cash-flow and voting rights are separated under such a mechanism in these firms 
(in contrast to a one-share-one-vote system), the consumption of private benefits tends to be greater in 
firms with dual-class shares compared to firms with single-class share structures (DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 1985; Grossman and Hart, 1988, and more recently, Masulis et al., 2009).8 As a result, dual-
class share firms tend to trade at a discount relative to single-class share companies (Lins, 2003; Durnev 
and Kim, 2005; Smart et al., 2008). I source this data item from Worldscope, using their ‘Currently a 
Multiple Share Company’ indicator which they define as “Currently a multiple share company indicates 
which companies currently have more than one type of common/ordinary share”. The second and third 
                                                 
8 Durnev and Kim (2005, 2007) show using CLSA and S&P corporate governance data that in firms where control 
rights exceed cashflow rights (e.g. dual-class share firms), corporate governance standards tend to be lower in these 
firms, relative to firms where no such differences (or much smaller differences) exist between control and cashflow 
rights (e.g. single-class share firms). 
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corporate governance measures that I employ are measures, which gauge the extent of agency conflicts in 
a firm. The first is total (annual) sales divided by total assets, and is a measure of how effectively the firm’s 
assets are deployed to generate (sales) revenue. Ang et al. (2000) theorize that agency costs decrease as this 
ratio increases. The third measure, also from Ang et al. (2000) is the ratio of operating expenses to annual 
sales. Since excessive prerequisite consumption and other agency costs are likely to manifest into higher 
operating expenses, higher values of this variable imply higher agency costs, and thus poorer corporate 
governance. Singh and Davidson (2003), Bartram et al. (2008) (in an earlier version of their paper) and 
McKnight and Weir (2009) use variants of these agency cost ratios in their respective studies.9 One 
potential drawback of using these agency cost measures in this context is that some studies also use 
Tobin’s q to measure agency costs. Here, agency costs are expected to decrease in Tobin’s q. 
Consequently, the correlations amongst the agency cost proxies i.e., amongst Tobin’s q and the other 
variables may be driving my results. While I cannot definitively rule out this possibility, the correlations 
amongst the variables are small, and suggest that this may not be a major issue. For example, the 
correlation coefficient between Tobin’s q and (annual) sales to total assets is just 0.076 and –0.045 for 
Tobin’s q and operating expenses to annual sales. In addition, and in order to try and overcome this 
potential problem, I estimate in Table 6, separate regressions for firms with high and low pre-investable 
agency costs. If firms with low pre-investable agency costs (and thus presumably better governance) reap 
the largest gains from becoming investable, this then suggests that better governed firms reap the largest 
gains from becoming investable, and that this result is not ‘mechanically’ driven by the correlation 
amongst the variables in the post-investable period.  
 Table 1 displays the number of single and dual-class investable firms, and also the median value 
of the two agency cost ratios (calculated over the entire sample period) for our sample of investable firms, 
for each country. These summary measures suggest that corporations are better-governed in Colombia, 
South Africa, and Turkey (using sales-to-assets). In contrast, agency conflicts tend to be severe in China. 
Finally, 55 or 21.91% of the entire sample of investable firms are deemed dual-class share firms. Greece 
                                                 
9 These agency cost proxies are employed as dependent variables (industry-adjusted) in the McKnight and Weir 
(2009) study, while Bartram et al. (2008) employ the ratios as independent variables in corporate total payout 
regressions.   
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and Mexico provide the greatest number with 11 each. India, Pakistan, and Turkey contribute no dual-
class share investable firm to the final sample.    
 
3. Investability, Corporate Governance and Firm Value 
 This section presents the main results on the relationship between investability, corporate 
governance and firm value. I begin by first examining the relationship between investability and firm value 
as per Mitton and O’Connor (2011). I then estimate the joint-effect of investability and corporate 
governance on firm value.    
 
3.1 Regression Estimates 
 In line with Mitton and O’Connor (2011), I first try to establish a causal link between investability 
and firm value. The results are outlined in Table 2. In subsequent analysis, I attempt to uncover whether it 
is better-governed firms that enjoy the largest valuation gains from becoming investable.   
 To do the former, I estimate a series of firm-fixed effects regressions of the following form: 
it it it t i itTobin's q X Investable Year Firm       (1) 
Where Tobin’s qit is Tobin’s q for firm i in year t, Xit is a set of firm and industry controls (sales growth, 
size, global industry q, leverage and profitability), and Investable are 0/1 dummies. Yeart and Firmi 
represent a full set of year and firm fixed-effects. The coefficient estimates are outlined in Table 2, with t-
statistics calculated using standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering reported in square brackets 
underneath (Petersen, 2009).10   
 In Column 1 of Table 2, I regress Tobin’s q on the investable dummies alone (time and fixed 
effects are included).  In subsequent columns, I sequentially add firm and industry-level control variables.  
Column 6 presents the coefficient estimates with all firm and industry-level control variables included.  In 
                                                 
10 In unreported analysis, I show that the average and median investable firms is worth more than comparable non-
investable firms in all but two years from 1988 to 2000. Interestingly, in the latter years of the sample period, dual-
class share investable firms tend to be worth more single-class share. In event time (see Figure 1), both single- and 
dual-class investable firms tend to be worth more than non-investable firms in the years immediately prior and 
subsequent to the investable year. The valuation premia disappear on the fifth year of becoming investable. 
However, the summary statistics suggest that they manifest again after five years of becoming investable. O’Connor 
(2010) does in fact show that “investable premia” does reappear once firms have been investable for at least five 
years, and in turn, he shows that “investable premia” are permanent. These summary findings are available from me 
upon request.     
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the remaining columns of Table 2, I control for indirect investability. In column 7, I add cross-listing 
dummy variables to column 6. In column 8, country fund data is added to the specification in column 6. 
The coefficient estimates on the investable dummies are positive and statistically significant in all 
regressions.  The coefficient estimates range from 0.101 to 0.139. Since the median investable firm has a 
Tobin’s q of 1.20, this suggests that the act of becoming fully investable causes an average change in value 
of 10.5% (i.e., (0.126/1.20)*100) for the median firm. Also, the control variables tend to be of the correct 
sign and are statistically significant. Firm value increases with leverage, profitability, firm and industry 
growth, while smaller firms tend to be worth more. 11 I document a cross-listing premium for Level 2 
firms, but none for Level 3 capital-raising firms. Finally, country-fund availability impacts positively on 
firm value. In the remaining rows of Table 2, I re-estimate Eq. (1), but now, I measure openness to 
foreign investment using degree-open factors, a continuous variable ranging from zero (not open to 
foreign investors) to one (fully open to foreign investors). The coefficient estimates using the degree-open 
factors only serve to reinforce the findings just presented. Again, in all specifications, the coefficient 
estimates on the degree-open factors are positive and always statistically significant. These findings 
confirm the findings of Mitton and O’Connor (2011).     
 Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 examine how the valuation gains, documented in Table 2, differ by level of 
corporate governance. In Table 3, I examine how the valuation gains from investability differ for single 
and dual-class investable firms. To do so, I estimate four different regression specifications, to account for 
the fact that the dual-class share indicator is time-invariant. In this instance, I can no longer estimate firm-
fixed effects regressions (if I also want to include the dual-class dummy variable), since the fixed effects 
estimator uses a within-transformation, which would eliminate all time-invariant variables.12 In its place, I 
estimate pooled ordinary least squares estimates (POLS), random effects panel regressions (RE), a 
Chamberlain (1984) type model, which specifies the unobserved heterogeneity as a function of the firm-
level means of the included (time-variant) regressors, as specified by Mundlak (1978), and finally, the fixed 
effects vector decomposition (FEVD) regression approach of Plumber and Troeger (2007, 2011).13 
                                                 
11 Leverage tends to be value enhancing when managerial agency costs are severe (Harvey et al., 2004).        
12 In subsequent analysis, I do estimate a series of separate fixed-effects regressions for single- and dual-class 
investable firms alone.  
13 Others that use the fixed effects vector decomposition approach include Lensink and van der Molen (2010) and 
Davies et al. (2008).  
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Amongst others, the benefit of using all four is that they allow me to include the dual-class (time-
invariant) indicator. However, there are potential shortcomings in using each approach. For example, the 
pooled ordinary least squares estimates are likely to suffer from an omitted variable bias (unobserved 
heterogeneity) and be inconsistent. It is hard to envisage instances in which firm value is not affected by 
unobserved heterogeneity/attributes such as entrepreneurial skills/managerial ability, and access to 
valuable networks. The random effects approach overcomes this shortcoming to a point. The random 
effects approach accounts for the unobserved heterogeneity, but assumes that it is uncorrelated with other 
right-hand side (observable) variables. However, the results from a standard Hausman test suggest that 
this is not the case. Given the shortcomings of these approaches, I estimate a series of separate firm fixed-
effects regressions for single- and dual-class share investable firms (and all non-investable firms) in Table 
4, and for single- and dual-class share investable firms relative to other single- and dual-class non-
investable firms in Table 5. The final approach, advocated by Plumber and Troeger (2007, 2011) is the 
fixed effects vector decomposition estimator. This approach decomposes the firm specific fixed effects 
 iFirm  into an unexplained part and a part explained by the time-invariant variables. It is estimated in 
three distinct steps. In the first step, the (firm) fixed effects are retrieved from a fixed-effects regression: 
    it it t i itTobin's q X Year Firm  (2) 
Second, an ordinary least squares regression of the fixed effects on the time-invariant variables is 
performed: 
   
^
i i 2iFirm Dual-Class  
(3) 
The final step, estimated using pooled ordinary least squares includes all time-variant and invariant 
variables plus the error term from the second stage regression: 14 
it 1 it 2 it 3 it i 4 i
t c 2i it
Tobin's q X Investable Investable * Dual Class Dual Class
Year Country
       
     
 
(4) 
In summary, Table 3 contains coefficient estimates from the following four regression specifications: 
                                                 
14 I follow Lensink and van der Molen (2010) by including time fixed effects (year dummies) in both the first and 
third steps of the FEVD regressions. Also, I find that the coefficient estimates from the fixed effects vector 
decomposition regressions are qualitatively unchanged when I exclude country fixed-effects from stage 3 (Eq. (4)).      
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it 1 it 2 it 3 it i 4 i
t c it
Tobin's q X Investable Investable * Dual Class Dual Class
Year Country
       
   
 
POLS: (5) 
it 1 it 2 it 3 it i 4 i
t i c it
Tobin's q X Investable Investable * Dual Class Dual Class
Year Firm Country
       
    
 
RE: (6) 
it 1 it 2 it 3 it i 4 i
t i c it
Tobin's q X Investable Investable * Dual Class Dual Class
Year Mundlak Country
       
    
 
Mundlak: (7) 
it 1 it 2 it 3 it i 4 i
t c 2i it
Tobin's q X Investable Investable * Dual Class Dual Class
Year Country
       
     
 
FEVD: (8) 
 In these regression specifications, the coefficient estimate (β2) captures the effect of investability 
on the value of single-class investable firms alone. The sum (β2 + β3) of the sole investable (degree-open) 
dummy (β2) and the interaction of the investable (degree-open) dummy with the dual-class indicator (β3) 
capture the effect of investability on the value of dual-class firms. Thus, the coefficient on the interaction 
term tells us how dual-class share firms perform relative to single-class share firms when both become 
investable. A priori, if single-class share firms reap larger valuation gains than dual-class firms, a priori, I 
would expect (β2) to be positive and statistically significant (as per Table 2), and (β2 + β3) to be less than 
(β2). If investability results in valuation gains for dual-class share firms, then (β2 + β3) should be positive.      
 The coefficient estimates in Table 3 suggest that this is not the case. In line with the analysis 
presented in Table 2, the coefficient estimates on the sole investable (and degree-open factor) variable (β2) 
is always positive and statistically significant; single-class share firms do experience a large and statistically 
significant “investable premia”. The coefficient estimates (using the investable dummies) range from 0.072 
to a high of 0.208, with an average coefficient estimate of 0.143. Since the median single-class share 
investable firm has a Tobin’s q of 1.17, this suggests that the act of becoming fully investable causes an 
average change in value of 12.22% for the median single-class share investable firm (i.e., 
(0.143/1.17)*100). Dual-class share investable firms appear to do just as well; the coefficient estimates on 
the interaction terms are negative (and small), and always statistically insignificant, suggesting that dual-
class share firms do just as well as single-class firms once both become investable. For these firms, act of 
becoming investable causes an average change in value of 11% (i.e., (0.143/1.30)*100), almost identical to 
the change in value experienced by single-class share investable firms.        
 13 
 Since these findings run contrary to my prior expectations, and given the potential concerns with 
the estimators employed in Table 3, I explore this issue further in Table 4. I now modify my original 
sample of firms in such a manner to allow me to estimate a series of firm fixed-effects regressions a la 
Mitton and O’Connor (2011). To do so, I create two distinct samples of firms. In the first, I retain all non-
investable firms, and keep only single-class share investable firms. In the second, I again retain all non-
investable firms, and keep only dual-class share investable firms. I then estimate Eq. (1) for both sub-
samples of firms and using both measures of access to foreign ownership.15 If the results from Table 3 
hold, I would then expect to find no significant difference in the coefficient estimates on the investable 
dummy for both single- and dual-class firms in the firm fixed-effects regressions. The coefficient estimates 
presented in Table 4 suggest otherwise.    
 In Table 4, I estimate a series of firm-fixed effects regressions, but now for single- and dual-class 
investable firms alone. The coefficient estimates for single-class investable firms are presented in columns 
1 to 4. The corresponding estimates for dual-class firms are presented in the remaining columns of Table 
4 (5 to 8). The coefficient estimates suggest that only single-class share investable firms enjoy an 
“investable premium”. For these firms, the coefficient estimates on both the investable and degree-open 
factors are positive and statistically significant, ranging from 0.104 to 0.161 (0.140 to a high of 0.191 using 
the degree-open factors), with an average coefficient estimate of 0.134 (0.171 using the degree-open 
factors). These coefficient estimates imply an average change in value of 11.45% (i.e., (0.134/1.17)*100) 
for single-class share firms.  
 In contrast to both the findings presented for single-class share firms and the results presented in 
Table 3, there is no “investable premium” for dual-class share firms. The coefficient estimates are positive 
on the investable and degree-open factors, but always statistically indifferent to zero. These results suggest 
that the “investable premium” is large and statistically significant for single-class share firms; for dual-class 
share firms, there is no premium. These findings are in line with my prior expectations, and are consistent 
with the view that better-governed firms should reap the largest gains from becoming investable. In this 
paper, I find that single-class share firms, typically better-governed than dual-class share firms do. Using 
the liberalization of the Korean equity market, Bae and Goyal (2010) find likewise.  
                                                 
15 The sample size now drops to 9,523 firm-year observations when I exclude dual-class share investable firms and 
8,100 when I exclude single-class share investable firms.   
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 Finally, the coefficient estimates on the control variables from Tables 3 and 4 are correctly signed 
and invariably statistically significant. In all specifications, dual-class share firms tend to be worth less than 
single-class share firms. This is in line with a large literature, which suggests that investors apply a larger 
discount rate to these firms (Lins, 2003; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Smart et al., 2008; Masulis et al., 2009). 
Finally, firm value tends to increase in firm and industry growth, leverage and profitability. Large firms 
tend to be valued less highly than smaller firms. 
 Table 4 suggests that only single-class share investable firms enjoy an “investable premium”. 
Nonetheless, these findings do not rule out the possibility that dual-class share firms enjoy an “investable 
premium” when compared to other non-investable dual-class share firms. Table 4 suggests that when 
compared to single- and dual-class non-investable firms, dual-class share investable firms do not 
experience an “investable premium”. They may well do so relative to just non-investable dual-class firms. 
In Table 5, I explore this possibility. Here, I partition the original sample into two distinct groups. In the 
first group, I exclude all single-class share firms (investable and non-investable) and keep just dual-class 
share firms. In the second, I exclude all dual-class share firms (investable and non-investable) and keep 
just single-class share firms. The coefficient estimates for single-class firms confirm what we already know; 
these firms enjoy large “investable premia”. Interestingly, dual-class firms enjoy an “investable premium” 
relative to other dual-class firms. Using both investable and degree-open factors to measure openness to 
foreign investment, the coefficient estimates are positive and statistically significant. In fact, they also 
reveal, relative to their peers, dual-class firms outperform single-class share investable firms (compare 
0.286 versus 0.171, and 0.257 versus 0.122).16 In part, this is consistent with King and Segal (2009) who 
document large cross-listing premia for dual-class cross-listing Canadian firms. The difference between 
investable dual-class firms and cross-listing dual-class firms is that the cross-listing firms bond to provide 
greater disclosures and subject themselves to greater scrutiny as a result of exchange listing in the U.S. In 
contrast, investability is not necessarily associated with such explicit bonding mechanisms. Consequently, 
exchange cross-listings (i.e., Level 2/3 ADRs) are associated with much larger valuation gains for dual-
class firms.  
                                                 
16 In unreported results, I also show that these results hold when I also account for indirect investability, namely 
cross-listings in the U.S. and the availability of a country-fund. The results are available from me upon request.     
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 The results thus far are in line with prior expectations. Well-governed firms reap the largest gains 
from becoming investable. Relative to the entire sample of firms, dual-class firms don’t experience any 
valuation gains, although, relative to their peers (i.e., other dual-class non-investable firms), they do. In the 
next section, I examine whether these findings manifest when I use alternative measures of corporate 
governance.   
 Table 6 contains the coefficient estimates using the agency cost proxies. In this section, I follow a 
similar approach to Mitton and O’Connor (2011). 17 I re-estimate Eq. (1), but now for investable firms 
who are either well-governed (their pre-investable agency cost/governance measure is above (below) the 
sample median using sales-to-assets (operating expenses-to-sales) or poorly-governed (their pre-investable 
agency cost measure is below (above) the sample median using sales-to-assets (operating expenses-to-
sales). A priori, I would expect that the coefficient on the investable dummy (degree-open factor) to be 
greatest for firm with low pre-investable agency costs (i.e. better corporate governance). This is in fact 
what I find.18 In all regressions, the control variables are included, but only reported using the investable 
dummy regressions for brevity sake. The coefficient estimates suggest that it is only better-governed firms 
that experience valuation gains from becoming investable. Using both agency cost measures, the 
coefficient estimates for the better-governed firms (Above-median sales-to-assets and below-median 
operating expenses-to-sales) are both positive and statistically significant. In contrast, the coefficient 
estimates on the investable dummy for pre-investable poorly governed firms are smaller, and statistically 
insignificant. Specifically, using the investable dummies, the coefficient estimates on the investable dummy 
for better-governed investable firms (i.e., Above-median sales-to-assets and below-median operating 
expenses-to-sales) are 0.196 and 0.186, respectively. In contrast, for poorly governed firms (i.e., Below-
median sales-to-assets and above-median operating expenses-to-sales) the coefficient estimates are much 
smaller (0.086 and 0.037, respectively) and statistically indifferent to zero. The same holds when I use the 
degree-open factors. In summary, these results, together with the findings presented in Tables 4 and 5 
suggest that the “investable premia” documented by Mitton and O’Connor (2011) is much higher for 
single-class share firms, and better-governed firms in general.    
                                                 
17 Mitton and O’Connor (2011) perform a similar exercise for investable firms using (pre-investable) measures of 
financing constraints.   
18 For comparison sake, I also present the coefficient estimate for the entire sample of firms. 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
 Over the course of the last two decades, a sizable literature has demonstrated how financial 
liberalization reforms have proved beneficial for firms. One such reform, namely stock market 
liberalizations have served to reduce the cost of equity capital for firms, reduced their financing 
constraints, which in turn has fostered greater investment, and ultimately has increased their value. 
However, subsequent work has suggested that the benefits are not as large as expected, and that agency 
conflicts at both the country and firm level may explain these findings. In this paper I examine whether 
agency conflicts at the level of the firm impacts on the size of the “investable premia” documented by 
Mitton and O’Connor (2011). Using a sample of Korean firms, Bae and Goyal (2010) find that better-
governed firms reap the largest gains following the liberalization of the Korean stock market. Using firm-
specific measures of stock market liberalizations, and employing 251 investable firms across 20 different 
countries, I do likewise.    
 Using three measures to proxy for the extent of agency conflicts, I show that the “investable 
premia” documented by Mitton and O’Connor (2011) is greatest for transparent, well-governed and 
single-class share firms. In contrast, for poorly governed firms the benefits are much lower. Stock market 
liberalizations do increase the value of dual-class share firms, at least relative to their peers, but their 
“investable premia” are much lower than that of single-class share firms. The findings are in line with 
recent evidence, which demonstrates that outside investors, most notably institutional investors prefer to 
invest in single-class share, and well-governed firms (Li et al., 2008). For these firms, the resulting 
investment results in large “investable premia”. Furthermore these findings suggest that more attention 
should be paid by firms to improving their corporate governance prior to investability, so that firms can 
extract the largest gains possible from stock market liberalizations.     
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Table 1 
Sample statistics by country 
 Sample Single & Dual-
Class Firms 
Agency Costs ADR Key Dates 
 # Obs # 
Invest 
# NI Total Inv & 
SC 
Inv & 
DC 
AC1 AC2 ADR First 
Invest 
First 
ADR 
Country 
Fund 
Argentina 75 3 9 12 2 1 0.37 0.86 0 1992 - 1991 
Brazil 363 9 44 53 1 8 0.95 0.94 7 1991 1994 1992 
Chile 265 11 30 41 9 2 0.50 0.85 5 1992 1993 1992 
China 313 2 68 70 0 2 0.59 2.15 1 1992 1995 1992 
Colombia 63 2 6 8 1 1 1.35 0.97 1 1991 1994 1992 
Greece 660 20 86 106 9 11 0.91 0.91 1 1988 1990 1998 
India 1,123 12 185 197 12 0 0.72 0.91 10 1991 1993 1991 
Indonesia 496 1 78 79 0 1 0.41 0.84 1 1993 1996 1991 
Israel 91 6 11 17 6 0 0.52 0.92 0 1994 - 1994 
Korea 1,317 56 120 176 56 0 0.74 0.93 10 1988 1991 1984 
Malaysia 1,671 45 178 223 45 0 0.64 0.90 4 1988 1992 1987 
Mexico 329 15 21 36 4 11 0.65 0.86 14 1988 1991 1982 
Pakistan 303 3 51 54 3 0 0.62 0.88 0 1994 - 1994 
Peru 61 2 12 14 0 2 0.49 0.93 0 1993 - NA 
Philippines 216 5 33 38 2 3 0.36 0.84 3 1993 1995 1990 
Portugal 280 9 30 39 7 2 0.98 0.97 2 1988 1990 1987 
Sth Africa 750 23 43 66 20 3 1.27 0.89 18 1982 1994 1994 
Taiwan 538 14 98 112 13 1 0.65 0.92 10 1990 1992 1990 
Thailand 874 7 129 136 0 7 0.89 0.93 0 1989 1999 1989 
Turkey 204 6 27 33 6 0 1.37 0.92 1 1991 1994 1990 
 9,992 251 1,259 1,510 196 55 0.78 0.91 88    
The table reports summary statistics of the sample by country. Investable dates are taken from the Emerging Markets Database 
(EMDB). # Obs is the number of firm-year observations; # Invest is the number of investable firms; # NI is the number of 
non-investable firms, and # Total is the total number of firms. Inv & SC and Inv & DC are the number of single and dual-class 
investable firms, respectively. AC1 and 2 are measures of the extent of agency costs. AC1 is measured as sales to assets and AC2 
is operating expenses to sales. All information on ADRs is sourced from the Bank of New York, Citibank, NYSE, and 
NASDAQ. The number of ADRs refers to the number of firms with ADRs that also have post-listing financial data. First 
Invest and First ADR is the first year Investable and ADRs appear in the sample. First country fund dates are taken form 
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) and Patro (2005).    
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Table 2 
Regression estimates of the effect of investability on firm value 
 Investable Dummies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Investable 
 
0.117*** 
(3.15) 
0.120*** 
(3.22) 
0.132*** 
(3.60) 
0.136*** 
(3.72) 
0.136*** 
(3.72) 
0.125*** 
(3.43) 
0.139*** 
(3.80) 
0.101*** 
(2.76) 
Firm Size 
 
 -0.011 
(0.53) 
-0.073*** 
(3.09) 
-0.073*** 
(3.10) 
-0.074*** 
(3.14) 
-0.079*** 
(3.36) 
-0.077*** 
(3.31) 
-0.097*** 
(4.29) 
Firm Growth 
 
  0.825*** 
(8.15) 
0.830*** 
(8.19) 
0.835*** 
(8.28) 
0.696*** 
(6.82) 
0.688*** 
(6.77) 
0.624*** 
(6.21) 
Global Industry Q 
 
   1.065*** 
(6.98) 
1.066*** 
(6.99) 
1.022*** 
(6.84) 
0.978*** 
(6.55) 
0.973*** 
(6.45) 
Firm Leverage 
 
    0.035 
(0.39) 
0.218*** 
(2.34) 
0.213** 
(2.29) 
0.265*** 
(2.94) 
Firm Profitability 
 
     0.951*** 
(7.01) 
0.944*** 
(6.95) 
0.968*** 
(7.33) 
Level 1 ADR 
 
      -0.029 
(0.27) 
 
Level 2 ADR 
 
      0.256*** 
(2.79) 
 
Level 3 ADR 
 
      -0.065 
(0.59) 
 
Rule 144a/Reg S ADR 
 
      -0.369*** 
(3.38) 
 
Country Fund 
 
       0.928*** 
(13.96) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Obs 9,992 9,992 9,992 9,992 9,992 9,992 9,992 9,992 
R-Squared 0.039 0.031 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.013 0.013 0.010 
 Degree-Open Factor 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Degree-open 
 
0.162*** 
(3.98) 
0.165*** 
(4.03) 
0.177*** 
(4.37) 
0.184*** 
(4.57) 
0.185*** 
(4.58) 
0.173*** 
(4.29) 
0.179*** 
(4.42) 
0.139*** 
(3.48) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Obs 9,992 9,992 9,992 9,992 9,992 9,992 9,992 9,992 
R-Squared 0.041 0.033 0.001 0.010 0.010 0.014 0.014 0.010 
The table reports coefficient estimates from firm-fixed effects regressions with t-statistics (absolute value), adjusted for firm-
level clustering, in parentheses. The dependent variable is Tobin’s q. Openness to foreign investors is measured using either  
investable dummies or degree-open factors. Investable is a dummy variable that is set equal to one in years in which the firm is 
designated as investable., zero otherwise. The degree-open factor ranges from zero (not open to foreign investors) to one (fully 
open to foreign investors). Firm size is measured as the log of annual sales in real $U.S. Firm growth is measured as the 
(geometric) average real growth in sales over the prior two years. Global Industry Q is calculated as the average Q of all global 
firms within each industry classification. Firm leverage is total debt to total assets, and profitability is defined as ernings before 
interest and taxation (EBIT) to total assets. ADR variables are dummy variables that are set equal to one in years in which the 
firm has an ADR of the specified type. Country fund is a dummy variable indicating the existence of a closed-end country fund 
in the firm’s country. Also estimated but not reported are a full set of year dummies.  Statistical significance is denoted by ***, 
**, * for the 1%, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.          
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Table 3 
Regression estimates of the effect of investability and on firm value 
 Pooled Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(POLS) 
Random Effects 
(RE) 
Mundlak (1978) Fixed Effects Vector 
Decomposition 
(FEVD) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Degree-open 
 
0.218** 
(2.55) 
 0.189*** 
(4.73) 
 0.115* 
(1.69) 
 0.177*** 
(6.72) 
 
Degree-open * Dual-Class 
 
-0.056 
(0.47) 
 -0.031 
(0.41) 
 -0.075 
(0.65) 
 -0.018 
(0.31) 
 
Investable 
 
 0.208*** 
(3.24) 
 0.161*** 
(4.67) 
 0.072 
(1.26) 
 0.129*** 
(6.26) 
Investable * Dual-Class 
 
 -0.076 
(0.76) 
 -0.039 
(0.57) 
 -0.084 
(0.87) 
 -0.017 
(0.35) 
Dual-Class 
 
-0.182*** 
(2.71) 
-0.173*** 
(2.58) 
-0.263*** 
(4.06) 
-0.258*** 
(3.99) 
-0.195*** 
(2.88) 
-0.185*** 
(2.73) 
-0.179*** 
(18.78) 
-0.176*** 
(19.96) 
Firm Size 
 
-0.019 
(1.10) 
-0.024 
(1.33) 
-0.043*** 
(4.10) 
-0.045*** 
(4.23) 
-0.070* 
(1.86) 
-0.069* 
(1.83) 
-0.079*** 
(18.14) 
-0.079*** 
(17.72) 
Firm Growth 
 
0.591*** 
(4.39) 
0.603*** 
(4.46) 
0.647*** 
(7.97) 
0.650*** 
(7.99) 
0.796*** 
(6.02) 
0.798*** 
(6.04) 
0.698*** 
(8.78) 
0.696*** 
(8.75) 
Global Industry Q 
 
1.057*** 
(5.82) 
1.031*** 
(5.63) 
1.082*** 
(6.90) 
1.069*** 
(6.82) 
1.044*** 
(5.66) 
1.010*** 
(5.43) 
1.034*** 
(10.82) 
1.022*** 
(10.57) 
Firm Leverage 
 
-0.032 
(0.31) 
-0.038 
(0.37) 
0.085 
(1.47) 
0.078 
(1.34) 
0.182 
(1.22) 
0.176 
(1.18) 
0.226*** 
(4.74) 
0.218*** 
(4.57) 
Firm Profitability 
 
1.912*** 
(7.72) 
1.912*** 
(7.71) 
1.150*** 
(12.09) 
1.153*** 
(12.12) 
1.027*** 
(5.67) 
1.031*** 
(5.68) 
0.948*** 
(8.77) 
0.952*** 
(8.77) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Obs 9,992 9,992 9,992 9,992 9,992 9,992 9,992 9,992 
R-Squared 0.206 0.206 0.193 0.193 0.219 0.220 0.603 0.602 
The table reports coefficient estimates from a series of regressions which estimate the effect of openness to foreign investment 
and agency costs on firm value. Columns 1 and 2 reports coefficient estimates from pooled ordinary least squares estimates 
(POLS) with t-stats calculated using standard errors clustered by firm presented underneath in brackets. Columns 3 and 4 
reports coefficient estimates from random effects regressios. Columns 5 and 6 do likewise using Mundlak (1978) correction 
terms to account for unobserved heterogeneity. Columns 7 and 8 report coefficient estimates from Fixed Effects Vector 
Decomposition (FEVD) regressions. The dependent variable is Tobin’s q. The degree-open factor ranges from zero (not open 
to foreign investors) to one (fully open to foreign investors). Dual-Class is 1 if the firm is a dual-class firm, 0 otherwise. Firm 
size is measured as the log of annual sales in real $U.S. Firm growth is measured as the (geometric) average real growth in sales 
over the prior two years. Global Industry Q is calculated as the average Q of all global firms within each industry classification. 
Firm leverage is total debt to total assets, and profitability is defined as earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT) to total 
assets. Also estimated but not reported are a constant, a full set of year dummies, and a full set of country dummies (In 
specifications 1-6). Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.     
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Table 4 
Regression estimates of the effect of investability on firm value for single- and dual-class share firms 
 Investable Dummies 
 Single-Class Share Investable Firms & All Non-
Investable Firms 
Dual-Class Share Investable Firms & All Non-
Investable Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Investable 
 
0.127** 
(2.20) 
0.145*** 
(2.68) 
0.161*** 
(3.00) 
0.104** 
(1.97) 
0.134 
(1.16) 
0.120 
(1.07) 
0.131 
(1.22) 
0.144 
(1.32) 
Firm Size 
 
 -0.079* 
(1.89) 
-0.077* 
(1.86) 
-0.083** 
(2.17) 
 -0.065 
(1.54) 
-0.064 
(1.51) 
-0.106*** 
(2.75) 
Firm Growth 
 
 0.664*** 
(4.82) 
0.657*** 
(4.81) 
0.562*** 
(4.21) 
 0.562*** 
(3.87) 
0.559*** 
(3.85) 
0.533*** 
(3.80) 
Global Industry Q 
 
 0.975*** 
(4.51) 
0.967*** 
(4.48) 
0.866*** 
(4.22) 
 1.240*** 
(5.57) 
1.200*** 
(5.28) 
1.133*** 
(4.82) 
Firm Leverage 
 
 0.255* 
(1.72) 
0.247* 
(1.66) 
0.297** 
(2.12) 
 0.293* 
(1.74) 
0.293* 
(1.74) 
0.356** 
(2.22) 
Firm Profitability 
 
 0.907*** 
(4.79) 
0.894*** 
(4.73) 
0.920*** 
(5.04) 
 0.833*** 
(4.37) 
0.829*** 
(4.37) 
0.856*** 
(4.68) 
Level 1 ADR 
 
  -0.105 
(0.51) 
   0.084 
(0.36) 
 
Level 2 ADR 
 
  0.281*** 
(2.67) 
   0.260* 
(1.68) 
 
Level 3 ADR 
 
  -0.066 
(0.48) 
     
Rule 144a/Reg S ADR 
 
  -0.365** 
(2.21) 
   -0.412 
(1.41) 
 
Country Fund 
 
   0.947*** 
(8.92) 
   1.076*** 
(9.57) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Obs 9,523 9,523 9,523 9,523 8,100 8,100 8,100 8,100 
R-Squared 0.038 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.034 0.015 0.016 0.010 
 Degree-Open Factor 
 Single-Class Share Investable Firms & All Non-
Investable Firms 
Dual-Class Share Investable Firms & All Non-
Investable Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Degree-open 
 
0.165** 
(2.48) 
0.186*** 
(2.94) 
0.191*** 
(2.99) 
0.140** 
(2.23) 
0.104 
(0.79) 
0.084 
(0.65) 
0.090 
(0.72) 
0.077 
(0.62) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Obs 9,523 9,523 9,523 9,523 8,100 8,100 8,100 8,100 
R-Squared 0.039 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.034 0.015 0.016 0.010 
The table reports coefficient estimates from firm-fixed effects regressions with t-statistics (absolute value), adjusted for firm-
level clustering, in parentheses. Seperate regressions are performed for single- and dual-class investable firms. The dependent 
variable is Tobin’s q. Openness to foreign investors is measured using either  investable dummies or degree-open factors. 
Investable is a dummy variable that is set equal to one in years in which the firm is designated as investable., zero otherwise. 
The degree open factor ranges from zero (not open to foreign investors) to one (fully open to foreign investors). Firm size is 
measured as the log of annual sales in real $U.S. Firm growth is measured as the (geometric) average real growth in sales over 
the prior two years. Global Industry Q is calculated as the average Q of all global firms within each industry classification. Firm 
leverage is total debt to total assets, and profitability is defined as ernings before interest and taxation (EBIT) to total assets. 
ADR variables are dummy variables that are set equal to one in years in which the firm has an ADR of the specified type. 
Country fund is a dummy variable indicating the existence of a closed-end country fund in the firm’s country. Also estimated 
but not reported is a constant and a full set of year dummies.  Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5, and 
10% levels, respectively.          
 
 
 
 
 
 24 
Table 5 
Regression estimates of the effect of investability on firm value 
 Fixed Effects (FE) 
 Single-Class Share Firms Only Dual-Class Share Firms Only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Degree-open 
 
0.171*** 
(2.91) 
 0.286* 
(1.89) 
 
Investable 
 
 0.122** 
(2.44) 
 0.257* 
(1.83) 
Firm Size 
 
-0.135*** 
(3.64) 
-0.135*** 
(3.61) 
0.010 
(0.09) 
0.010 
(0.10) 
Firm Growth 
 
0.842*** 
(5.56) 
0.842*** 
(5.54) 
0.412** 
(2.07) 
0.406** 
(2.03) 
Global Industry Q 
 
0.986*** 
(4.42) 
0.969*** 
(4.33) 
1.074*** 
(2.84) 
1.067*** 
(2.81) 
Firm Leverage 
 
0.100 
(0.66) 
0.086 
(0.58) 
0.329 
(1.28) 
0.327 
(1.28) 
Firm Profitability 
 
1.021*** 
(4.70) 
1.024*** 
(4.68) 
0.800*** 
(2.90) 
0.807*** 
(2.93) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Obs 7,091 7,091 2,901 2,901 
R-Squared 0.001 0.001 0.118 0.115 
The table reports coefficient estimates from a series of regressions which estimate the effect of openness to foreign investment 
on firm value. I report coefficient estimates from firm-fixed effects regressions with t-statistics (absolute value), adjusted for 
firm-level clustering, in parentheses. Seperate regressions are performed for dual- and single-class firms (investable and non-
investable), respectively. The dependent variable is Tobin’s q. The degree-open factor ranges from zero (not open to foreign 
investors) to one (fully open to foreign investors). Also estimated but not reported are a constant, a full set of year dummies. 
Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.     
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Table 6 
Regression estimates of the effect of investability and agency costs on firm value 
 Investable Dummies 
 Sales-to-Assets (Agency Cost 1) Operating Expenses-to-Sales (Agency Cost 2) 
 All Above 
Median AC 1 
Below 
Median AC 1 
All Above 
Median AC 2 
Below 
Median AC 2 
Investable 
 
0.125*** 
(3.43) 
0.196*** 
(2.84) 
0.086 
(1.38) 
0.125*** 
(3.43) 
0.037 
(0.66) 
0.186** 
(2.22) 
Firm Size 
 
-0.074*** 
(3.14) 
-0.126** 
(2.23) 
-0.063 
(1.31) 
-0.074*** 
(3.14) 
-0.081* 
(1.80) 
-0.029 
(0.36) 
Firm Growth 
 
0.835*** 
(8.28) 
0.850*** 
(3.19) 
0.586*** 
(3.62) 
0.835*** 
(8.28) 
0.487*** 
(2.90) 
0.918*** 
(4.39) 
Global Industry Q 
 
1.066*** 
(6.99) 
1.522*** 
(9.36) 
0.819*** 
(3.94) 
1.066*** 
(6.99) 
0.776*** 
(3.34) 
1.292*** 
(5.12) 
Firm Leverage 
 
0.035 
(0.39) 
0.092 
(0.51) 
0.155 
(0.83) 
0.035 
(0.39) 
0.292 
(1.56) 
0.010 
(0.04) 
Firm Profitability 
 
-0.074*** 
(3.14) 
0.860*** 
(3.52) 
0.868*** 
(3.50) 
-0.074*** 
(3.14) 
0.306 
(1.51) 
1.967*** 
(4.52) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Obs 9,992 3,829 6,163 9,992 5,911 4,081 
R-Squared 0.013 0.010 0.029 0.013 0.010 0.133 
 Degree-Open Factor 
 Sales-to-Assets (Agency Cost 1) Operating Expenses-to-Sales (Agency Cost 2) 
 All Above 
Median AC 1 
Below 
Median AC 1 
All Above 
Median AC 2 
Below 
Median AC 2 
Degree-open 
 
0.185*** 
(4.58) 
0.223** 
(1.98) 
0.098 
(1.45) 
0.185*** 
(4.58) 
0.026 
(0.38) 
0.246*** 
(2.74) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Obs 9,992 3,829 6,163 9,992 5,911 4,081 
R-Squared 0.010 0.010 0.029 0.010 0.010 0.130 
The table reports coefficient estimates from firm-fixed effects regressions for seperate regressions for firms that were and were 
not above the sample median agency costs, with t-statistics (absolute value), adjusted for firm-level clustering, in parentheses. 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s q. Investable is a dummy variable that is set equal to one in years in which the firm is 
designated as investable., zero otherwise. Agency Costs is either sales to assets (Agency Cost 1) or operating expenses to sales 
(Agency Cost 2). Firm size is measured as the log of annual sales in real $U.S. Firm growth is measured as the (geometric) 
average real growth in sales over the prior two years. Global Industry Q is calculated as the average Q of all global firms within 
each industry classification. Firm leverage is total debt to total assets, and profitability is defined as earnings before interest and 
taxation (EBIT) to total assets. Also estimated but not reported are a full set of year dummies. Statistical significance is denoted 
by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.     
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Investability and Tobin’s q 
 
  
  
  
Figure 1: This figure displays the mean and median value of investable firms from five years prior to becoming investable 
to ten years after. The top row displays the mean and median absolute and relative value of investable firms. Absolute value 
is measured using Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q is calculated as the book value of debt plus market capitalization divided by the book 
value of assets. Market value of debt is proxied using its book value counterpart, and the replacement cost of assets as the 
book value of assets. Book value of debt is calculated as the book value of total assets less the book value of equity. Relative 
value is measured using median-adjusted Relative q. Median-adjusted relative Tobin’s q is calculated as the value of each 
investable firm divided by the median value of all non-investable firms in each firm’s home country (in each year). The 
bottom row displays the absolute and relative value of single- and dual-class share investable firms.     
 
